Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
We have just won a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes. The next war may be fought with airplanes with no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now that there will be no basis for comparison. Take everything you've learned about aviation in war and throw it out of the window and let's go to work on tomorrow's aviation. It will be different from anything the world has ever seen.
Henry H. "Hap" Arnold General Arnold's vision of fighter aircraft "with no men in them at all," has yet to fully materialize despite the fact that he spoke those words sixty years ago. The vision of a combat unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), however, did enter an infancy stage of reality during the Global War on Terror as UAV operators used weaponized Predators to strike targets in Afghanistan,
Yemen, and Iraq. The Predator UAV was originally designed as a reconnaissance platform, not a combat attack system. If the infamous terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 upon the World
Trade Center towers and the Pentagon never took place, it is unlikely that Hellfire-equipped
Predators would exist today. The reason is not for lack of vision-decades of documentation detail a multitude of potential UAV roles and missions for the future. The reason is that the UAV suffers an identity crisis. It has been trapped in an image of primarily being a reconnaissance platform and it has never had an advocate in a position to champion its advancement and development to other roles and missions.
In his book, The Masks of War, author Carl H. Builder details the "entrenched institutions and distinct 'personalities' of the three armed services." Builder asserts the Army's sense of identity: "was skewed by its experiences during World War II" and "has been frozen there by the interests of its powerful branch structure." 1 The UAV's identity crisis is similar in nature, but its image paralysis may be even more difficult to overcome. Its sense of identity was likewise skewed by past experiences and frozen by the interests of the power structure. However, unlike the Army's situation, the UAV is not trapped against moving toward change because internal fiefdoms want to maintain power within the status quo, but because the UAV has no fiefdom to affect change.
INTRODUCTION TO UAV HISTORY
One major obstacle to the wider development of UAVs is that eventual users of any new technology are historically reluctant to embrace it. This is particularly true when strategic military leaders and operators deem existing systems adequate and there appears little reason to replace them. Social theorists and scientists call this tendency "structural inertia," whereby firms and organizations (in the business world) must experience a survival-threatening crisis before meaningful change can be catalyzed.
After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the US Navy designed and successfully tested attack remotely piloted vehicles. Despite these successful experiments, Admiral Jack Towers, head of US Naval Aviation, "was opposed to any program of production until the new device had shown itself to be superior in combat to the conventional manned aircraft of the fleet" (emphasis added Despite these recent mission accomplishments, the UAV's potential to perform in more diverse roles has barely yet to be fully explored and exploited.
FIRST UAV CONTACT
The Wright brothers were recently honored worldwide for making aviation history 100 years ago. By comparison, the first developers of unmanned aircraft (e.g., Rene Lorin of The British also conducted extensive experiments with radio control and produced unmanned aircraft with speeds much greater than manned aircraft of the era. 19 Follow-on British efforts focused on developing remotely piloted aerial targets. In 1933, a radio-controlled floatplane revealed the vulnerability of ships to attack from the air. Simulating an air attack on the British Royal Navy, the unmanned aircraft survived more than two hours of heavy naval the Radioplane Company, which produced a radio-controlled, miniature monoplane. 22 The
Army Air Corps and Navy purchased nearly 1,000 Radioplane UAVs to provide their anti-aircraft gunners with realistic flying targets. 23 The following year, the Navy modified full-sized airplanes to serve as aerial targets. Upon learning of the Navy's efforts, General Hap Arnold desired to initiate a similar target program in the Army Air Corps. In 1939, he requested and received a suite of identical equipment for Air Corps research. 24 During the years between the world wars, militaries of different nations explored various areas of technology having potential application to UAVs. The most well-known product, however, used a simple, inexpensive engine first developed and patented in France in 1907. 25 In 1939, German scientists and engineers used its design to create prototypes of the Fiesler 103, now more widely known as the V-1 (Vergeltungswaffe Eins) Buzz Bomb.
WORLD WAR II
With a launch of 10 weapons on 13 June 1944, the V-1 became the first operational cruise missile. It was also the first jet-propelled weapon and the first strategic terror weapon used in war. The V-1 had three important advantages: it was relatively cheap to build, it did not place any undue demands on Germany's limited strategic resource materials, and it avoided the loss of scarce and valuable Luftwaffe crews. 26 From June 1944 through March 1945, the Luftwaffe attacked London by launching 8,892
V-1s from ground sites and approximately another 1,600 from aircraft. Allied fighters and antiaircraft guns destroyed most of these before they reached their intended targets. However, the 2,419 V-1s which did reach the London region killed 6,148 and seriously injured 17,981. 27 Germany launched an additional 12,000 V-1s towards Antwerp, of which 2,448 struck the vital Belgium port city. While the V-1s caused some considerable physical damage, their use as retaliatory weapons had much wider ramifications.
By August 1944, after only three months into the V-1 campaign, an estimated one and one-half million Londoners had fled the capital. Coupled with time spent in shelters, absenteeism, and an overall strain on civilian morale, productivity in the city's factories suffered.
The Allies diverted extensive airpower resources away from other missions to bomb V-1 launch sites and to shoot down V-1s in flight. These operations were costly-"nearly 450 aircraft were lost and 2,900 valuable aircrew lives were sacrificed."
28
In a separate program, the German army also produced its own retaliatory weapon--the A-4--which was later called the V-2. The V-2 was essentially a ballistic missile. Although less vulnerable and more physically destructive, the V-2 was a significant burden on Germany's warmaking capability. It was expensive, it used extremely complex technology, it required scarce materials, and it greatly overstressed Germany's electric and component industries. Comparing the V-1 and V-2 in terms of cost (in German marks) and labor: the V-2 cost 10,000 marks compared to 1,500 for the V-1, and it required 13,000 hours of slave labor compared to 280 for the V-1. 29 In terms of total destructive potential, because Germany produced and launched significantly fewer V-2s (3,200 compared to 22,400 V-1s), the V-1 delivered many times more explosive loads. 30 Ironically, because there was no apparent defense against the V-2, the Allies diverted fewer resources to counter it.
In addition to the V-1 cruise missile and V-2 ballistic missile, Germany employed other UAV weapon systems during World War II. Despite lessons learned in 1933 from the British test of the unmanned floatplane against naval defenses, the Royal Navy and the US Navy both suffered significant losses from German glide bombs. The two most prominent glide bomb systems were the Fritz X remotely guided bomb and the HS 293 remotely piloted jet-propelled aircraft. 31 Luftwaffe airborne controllers released these radio-controlled weapons and directed them by line of sight onto surface targets. In spite of a series of later improvements (adding a television monitor, altimeter readout, and remote control throttles), war-weary aircraft were vulnerable to German defenses and thus proved highly ineffective. In light of mission failures, Lt Gen James H. "Jimmy" Doolittle delivered sharp criticism upon the Aphrodite project: "It seems to me that this whole project is put together with bailing wire, chicken guts, and ignorance." 39 Despite the lack of operational UAV successes in World War II, the United States conducted valuable research and increased its knowledge base in this form of airpower. The military took great strides in guided vertical bomb research in radio, radar, television, and infrared controls. 40 In October 1945, the US Navy released drawings of unmanned jet aircraft concepts. Designers claimed that speeds up to 300 miles per hour and 4-G dives would be achievable. The Navy described the projects as "heralds of a supersonic age where only the mind of man can match the speed of the deadly creatures his genius has conceived." 41 Concepts such as these, however, came too late for operational employment during the war and they were not further pursued.
KOREAN WAR
The Korean War did little to prompt advances in UAV technologies. Some World War IIera guided bombs were used, but many were in poor condition due to sever deterioration from a long period in storage. Three specially modified B-29s employed approximately 30 glide bombs, and they accounted for destroying six bridges and damaging one. 42 While their poor accuracy was not a major factor against World War II-era targets (i.e., German cities and industries), they were essentially useless against most North Korean targets. Also during the Korean War, various manned aircraft were converted into flying bombs, which were remotely guided into heavily defended communist targets.
In 1951, the United States produced its first jet-engine target drone called the Firebee.
Virtually every US air defense weapon has been tested against Firebee droned developed by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical. 43 "The long term significance of Teledyne Ryan family of unmanned aircraft was their adaptability, and in particular their operational potential." 44 
POWERS SHOOTDOWN EVENT
The watershed event in U S UAV development history--the event which directed UAV R&D towards its current state--came on 1 May 1960. 46 It was the shootdown over the Soviet Union of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers. 47 United States' strategic leaders subsequently focused on developing unmanned intelligence collection platforms, and this directed efforts away from development of attack remotely piloted vehicles. The survival rates of US remotely-piloted vehicles in Southeast Asia were remarkable given their missions were flown in the full range of weather and combat conditions. One specially modified drone was reported to have drawn 10 or 11 SAMs before being shot down. 54 The top performing drone flew an incredible 68 sorties, averaging twelve targets per mission. 55 In the latter part of the war, survival rates of UAVs exceeded 90 percent. While difficult to make a direct comparison, there is a definite contrast with manned aircraft statistics: "In that same war America lost more than 2,500 manned aircraft, about 5,000 of her airmen were killed, and nearly 90 percent of all US servicemen taken prisoner were pilots and crewmen. gathering. 60 Most noteworthy was their effective use as decoys. By sending in UAVs to spearhead an attack, virtually all enemy SAMs were expended at once. This revealed SAM locations, and Israeli suppression of enemy air defenses sorties were thus able to follow and knock out missile defenses while the enemy was reloading. It was reported that one UAV safely returned for recovery after surviving attacks by 32 SAMs.
FROM SAC TO TAC
In light of tests and operational applications in Southeast Asia, lack of advocacy and proper oversight restrained any motivation in the United States to look beyond reconnaissance roles. The Air Force did develop ballistic missiles and precision-guided missions, but this was not because research revealed these systems should be pursued while others discounted. In fact, the Air Force conducted a study in 1974 on missions for UAVs and found itself guilty of ambivalence: "The study found that the concept of air combat drone/RPV systems was formulated in 1970, but little had been done subsequently to either promote the development of these systems or to dismiss them as viable systems for Air Force consideration." 61 There even rose an accusation that the Air Force suppressed the study because it revealed UAVs could perform several missions flown by pilots more cheaply and more effectively. In 1978 Sen. John Tower (R-Tex.) emphasized lack of Air Force support for UAVs in the following statement: "I suggest that a full-blown strike RPV program that would really impact on the numerical differences will not be easy for the Air Force to be enthusiastic over. The reason is that the Pentagon budget process is such that new programs are seldom recognized as complementary to, but rather as substitutes for." 63 Under TAC there was no serious follow-on study of UAVs to determine potential capabilities, roles in war, place in the force structure, nor concept of operations. 64 A 1974 Air University study, however, described conceptual programs capable of developing and fielding strike RPVs by the 1980s. 65 A 1975 industry study also revealed the heightened focus on RPVs during this time frame: "A great deal has been written in both the general and trade press over the past two years about drones and RPVs with much of the space devoted to the more exotic applications of unmanned vehicles such as aerial combat with manned aircraft." 66 The actual result is that only five years after proving their use in Southeast Asia, the United States would not have a single operational RPV in its inventory.
Lack of user support also restricted development of UAVs more than technological hurdles. 67 Speaking at an RPV symposium in June 1977, Lt Gen James D. Hughes, Twelfth Air
Force commander, expressed operator discontent with the evolution of RPVs. "Most of the problems encountered in the AQM-34V Program," he stated, "are because the drone is antiquated; the launch platform is antiquated; control technicians are antiquated; and the recovery of the vehicle is far too complex--and once recovered, the turnaround takes too long." 68 In 1981 a General Accounting Office (GAO) study stated, "RPVs appear to suffer from the attitude of the users and not from technological drawbacks or infeasible systems. 69 It also reiterated that UAVs were not popular with the military due to user reluctance and lack of funding support. 70 While it is difficult to justify reluctance for past users, it is nearly impossible to do so for present users. Many sources assert or mention user reluctance as a barrier to UAV development, but they offer little evidence. Despite the former SECAF's assertion that "this study is not going to sit on the shelf and gather dust," 77 the trend of UAV development since that time indicates it is difficult to implement these sorts of futuristic initiatives.
Another decade may pass, only to result in an updated repackaging of the New World Vistas or the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap. Unless the UAV identity crisis is understood and overcome by strategic leaders, actual support for truly innovative UAV roles and missions will not be fully realized and advanced UAV development will remain stagnated.
CONCLUSION
Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur. In this period of rapid transition from one form to another, those who daringly take to the new road first will enjoy the incalculable advantages of the new means of war over the old.
Giulio Today we better understand airpower's strengths and weaknesses. Using doctrinal underpinnings, lessons of war, and technological advances as guidelines, the quest continues to further comprehend and exploit the numerous advantages of airpower. In examining unmanned airpower, the UAV's sense of identity is ambiguous today due to past adversities.
Negative influences upon UAV development span across a historical timeline filled with biases (e.g., leadership bias, user bias, institutional bias, etc.) and budgetary setbacks.
By tracing and examining historical roots it is evident the United States had no organized plan nor structure which purposely led unmanned aircraft to its current state of existence.
Historical circumstances, however, did have an unfavorable effect upon any significant advancement of UAV roles and missions. During major modern wars and conflicts, UAV development revealed promising capabilities into a new realm of airpower. Technological hurdles were encountered, but these were often overcome with new and innovative discoveries.
However, when the wars ended and military budgets had to be cut, UAV research and development projects were always among the first to be sacrificed. UAV platforms were never able to mature enough to secure strong support structures in cultural, scientific, military, nor political arenas.
Lack of UAV development was not due to lack of strategic vision. Unlike other airpower means (and space-based systems), UAVs were not initially developed to serve as longer simply respond to the changing environment with belated modifications to existing systems and strategies. In order to remain the world's greatest superpower, US strategic leaders must be openly aggressive in the pursuit of innovation. The UAV's identity crisis has not prevented the world's greatest airpower force from gaining and maintaining its present state of superiority. It has, however, prevented the United States from appreciating and harnessing the full potential of UAVs. This may prove to be of great consequence in a future of ambiguous threats and challenges, as well as potential technological advancements, never before envisioned just a few years ago.
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